

Qaida with training in poisons and gases. For instance, in a speech on October 2002, the President said, "We've learned that Iraq has trained al-Qaida members in bomb making and poisons and deadly gases."

In February, 2003, the President said, "Iraq has also provided al-Qaida with chemical and biological weapons training."

In March of 2003, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said there was a "very strong link to training al-Qaida in chemical and biological weapons techniques, we know from a detainee that—the head of training for al-Qaida, that they sought help in developing chemical and biological weapons because they weren't doing very well on their own. They sought it in Iraq. They received the help."

Those statements were based on representations of Ibn al Shaykh al-Libi, a detained senior al-Qaida operative. But what the administration hid was the fact that the Defense Intelligence Agency did not believe al-Libi's statement. In February 2002, a year before the President claimed that Iraq "provided al-Qaida with chemical and biological weapons training," the DIA assessed that al-Libi "is more likely . . . intentionally misleading the debriefers."

Nor did the administration disclose a second DIA assessment in February of 2002 that said, "Iraq is unlikely to have provided bin Ladin any useful CB knowledge or assistance," or DIA's April 2000 assessment that there was no credible reporting on al-Qaida training "anywhere" in Iraq.

The administration's statements also flew in the face of the CIA's January 2003 assessment that al-Libi was not in a position to know whether training had taken place.

So here is what we have. The President still says that Saddam had a relationship with Zarqawi. The Senate Intelligence Committee found that the intelligence community, in 2005, concluded that "the regime did not have a relationship with, harbor, or turn a blind eye towards Zarqawi."

The President said that Saddam and al Qaida were "allies." The intelligence community found that intelligence shows that Saddam Hussein "viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime," and, indeed, as postwar intelligence shows, he, Saddam, "refused all requests from al-Qaida to provide material or operational support."

The Vice President called the claim that lead hijacker Mohammed Atta met with the Iraqi intelligence officer "credible" and "pretty much confirmed," but the Intelligence Committee report finds that the intelligence shows "no such meeting occurred."

The President said that Iraq provided training in poisons and gases to al-Qaida, but the Intelligence Committee finds that postwar intelligence supports prewar assessments that there was no credible reporting on al-Qaida

training "anywhere" in Iraq and that the terrorist who made the claim of training was "likely intentionally misleading his debriefers" when he said that Iraq had provided poisons and gases training.

But the administration's efforts to create the false impression that Iraq and al-Qaida were linked didn't stop with just statements. One of the most significant disclosures of the Intelligence Committee report is the account of the administration's successful efforts to obtain the support of CIA Director George Tenet to help them make that false case. The events were of major significance. They go to the heart of the administration's case for war on the eve of a congressional vote on whether to authorize that war. Here is what happened.

On October 7, 2002, in a speech in Cincinnati, the President represented that linkage existed between Saddam and terrorist groups. He said that "Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or an individual terrorist."

But on that very day, October 7, 2002, in a letter to Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham, the CIA declassified at the request of the committee the CIA assessment that it would be an "extreme step" for Saddam Hussein to assist Islamic terrorists in conducting a weapons-of-mass-destruction attack against the United States and that the likelihood of Saddam Hussein using weapons of mass destruction if he did not feel threatened by an attack was "low."

When made public, the CIA assessment would have undercut the President's case. Something had to be done. So on October 8, 2002, the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, issued a statement that "there is no inconsistency between our view of Saddam's growing threat and the view expressed by the President in his speech."

The Tenet statement was aimed at damage control and it undercut the CIA's own crucial assessment at a critical moment. The New York Times quoted Tenet prominently in a major story on October 9.

We called Tenet before the Intelligence Committee a month and a half ago, on July 26, 2006. In his testimony, quoted in the Intelligence Committee's report, Mr. Tenet admitted that perhaps there was an inconsistency between the President's statement and the CIA's assessment. Mr. Tenet said he issued his statement denying the inconsistency after policymakers expressed concern about the CIA's assessment, as expressed in the declassified October 7 letter. Again, that letter saying that it would be an extreme step for Saddam to assist Islamic terrorists in conducting a weapons-of-mass destruction attack.

I ask for an additional 3 minutes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LEVIN. Tenet admitted to the intelligence subcommittee that the policymakers wanted him to "say something about not being inconsistent with what the President had said." Tenet complied.

Tenet acknowledged to the committee, in his July 26, 2006, testimony, that issuing the statement was "the wrong thing to do."

It was much more than that. It was a shocking abdication of a CIA Director's duty not to act as a shill for any administration or its policies. Director Tenet issued that statement at the behest of the administration on the eve of the Congress's debate on the resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq. The use of the Director of Central Intelligence by the administration to contradict his own agency's assessment in order to support a policy goal of the administration is reprehensible, and it seriously damaged the credibility of the CIA.

Mr. President, I thank the Chair for its indulgence and I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?

#### RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL OF THE CHAIR

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent we stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

There being no objection, at 12:42 p.m., the Senate recessed subject to the call of the Chair and reassembled at 1:14 p.m. when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. ALLEN).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader is recognized.

Mr. REID. Thank you very much, Mr. President. I apologize for keeping you and the staff longer than you should have been, but I was unable to be here until just now. So thank you all very much for waiting for me.

#### SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE REPORT

Mr. REID. Mr. President, at noon today, the Senate Intelligence Committee released a report that proved evidence of two things: first, the Bush administration's case for war in Iraq was fundamentally misleading and deceptive and not supported by the underlying intelligence; second, the Republican-controlled Senate Intelligence Committee continues to put the political interests of the Bush White House ahead of the security of the American people.

According to today's report, the Bush administration desperately sought to prove a link between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden in order to shore up public assertions being made by the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, and other senior administration officials. But from this report which was made public today, at noon, we know these assertions directly contradicted the best assessments of our intelligence experts. In

short, the facts were not there to show any connection between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.

It is clear: The administration knew or should have known it was misleading America in its effort to make the case for a war in Iraq.

Just as significant, today's report shows America what you get with a Republican-led Congress. What do you get? You get the White House refusing to declassify information. And you find that in this report. You find that the White House refuses to declassify information that would embarrass them 2 months before a midterm election. And you get a Republican-led committee that is perfectly willing to bow down to the White House and keep the American people in the dark about its mistakes and its distortions.

Nearly 4 years since the war started in Iraq, 2½ years after the Republican chairman of the Intelligence Committee was pressured into starting this investigation, and nearly a year after Democrats sent the Senate into closed session to discuss the Republicans' stonewalling, 60 percent of the Intelligence Committee's investigation still is unfinished, and questions as to how and why the administration exaggerated and cherry-picked intelligence to sell its case for war remain unanswered.

These are critically, crucially important questions for our troops and our security. Authorizing the use of force and placing our citizens in harm's way is the most significant vote a Member of Congress can make, and it is essential we understand how this administration skewed that decision in the runup to the war in Iraq so we can take the steps necessary to ensure these abuses are never repeated. That is why you have to complete the work of the Intelligence Committee.

With 140,000 American troops serving bravely in the middle of a civil war in Iraq, bin Laden still at large, and a growing threat posed by North Korea and Iran, it is long past time this rubberstamping Republican Congress stood up to the Bush administration and did its job, did its job of being a separate and equal branch of Government.

The problem during the 6 years of President Bush's administration is that the Constitution has not been what it should be, not the checks and balances, not three separate, equal branches of Government. It is no mystery why there have been no vetoes—because the President has gotten everything he has wanted, with the exception of stem cell. Other than that, the Republican Congress has given him everything he has wanted.

We have had no congressional oversight. We have had committees not doing their work, as indicated by the Intelligence Committee today.

I do extend my congratulations to the entire committee. They do very valuable work for this country in dealing with the most sensitive issues

America has to deal with; that is, intelligence operations of this country. I am glad we have gotten 40 percent of the work that has been so long overdue. I look forward, in the weeks ahead, to getting the remaining 60 percent. I doubt it will happen before the elections, but it should.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WARNER). Without objection, it is so ordered.

### HONORING OUR ARMED FORCES

SPECIALIST STEPHEN P. DOWNING II

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise today to honor the life of a father, son, uncle, and brother from the Commonwealth of Kentucky who was lost in the line of duty as a member of America's Armed Forces. I ask the Senate to pause today in memory of SPC Stephen P. Downing II of Burkesville, KY. He was 30 years old.

On October 28, 2004, Specialist Downing and his squad were on patrol securing one of the busiest intersections in Ramadi, Iraq. As a key route for vital U.S. convoys, this crossroads had become a focal point of terrorist attacks. The threat to vulnerable U.S. vehicles meant soldiers like Stephen Downing were needed to stand guard against would-be bombers.

As his squad waited to be relieved at noon, Stephen, whose duty was simply to drive the armored humvee, volunteered to give his gunner a break from the intense heat. He climbed out of the relative safety of the driver's seat to man the .50 caliber machinegun mounted on top of the roof. Then, just a few minutes before his squad was to be replaced, he was fatally wounded by a lone sniper's bullet.

For his actions as a soldier, Specialist Downing earned numerous medals and awards, including the Bronze Star Medal and the Purple Heart.

Stephen Downing was a man of action, with a keen sense of right and wrong. He was more comfortable working on an engine or being outdoors than sitting inside. He was quick-witted, with a knack for pulling practical jokes. This quality endeared him to his family, friends, and fellow soldiers.

Stephen loved his family. As SPC Robert Gonzales, who served with Stephen Downing in both Korea and Iraq, recalls—using Stephen's nickname with the unit—

Steve D. was very proud of his kids. He always talked about how proud they made him. . . . I can't remember how many times he showed me a picture of his son and his daughter swimming in a pool, wearing floaties. He kept it with him all the time.

Stephen's fatherly tenderness extended beyond his daughter, Taylor,

and his son, Stephen, to include his niece, Chelsea. As Stephen's sister, Danica, says:

Stephen was like a father to my daughter . . . and Chelsea always looked up to Stephen.

When Stephen himself was a child, his appetite for adventure could not be satisfied. His sister recalls that her brother loved to go diving, swimming, skiing—if it was to be done outside, Stephen was eager to pursue the challenge.

When he was not taking things apart, he was putting them back together. Stephen loved modifying his BMX bikes, even if his modifications did not always turn out to be an improvement.

According to his stepfather, Jim Maynard, Stephen seemed blessed with a constant smile on his face.

And nothing could make Stephen smile more than pulling a prank on his sister. As the older sibling by almost 2 years, Danica was a constant presence for her brother growing up, helping him if older bullies tried to pick on him. But this didn't stop Stephen from having a good-natured laugh at her expense.

One morning, Stephen rushed out to catch the schoolbus and told the driver to go ahead because his sister was not going to school that day. About 3 miles down the road, the bus driver and everyone else on the bus learned the truth when Stephen's mother flagged down the schoolbus and Danica jumped on.

Another time, Danica was babysitting for a neighbor, and she and a girlfriend decided to take the baby for an evening stroll. Along their path they passed an abandoned old farm house, an infamously spooky local attraction.

As you might have guessed, Mr. President, what better way to scare your sister than to hide in the weeds by a house such as this and at the right time, jump out yelling. As Danica recounts, "Stephen scared [us] half to death . . . we both were so scared, we just took off screaming. It took us a minute to realize neither of us had brought the stroller."

Stephen enlisted in the Army in 1992. He joined the National Guard in 1994, and left the service in 2000. In 2002, however, Stephen felt compelled to reenlist in the Army. He was sent to Korea, where he was stationed with the Second Infantry Division.

After a year-long stint, his unit was ordered to prepare for deployment to Iraq. Given the choice between staying with the unit or being transferred to Fort Carson, CO, Stephen elected to go to war with the men he had come to know and depend on.

Shortly before Stephen deployed to Iraq with the 2nd I.D., he returned home for 2 weeks to be with his family. During that time, his mother, Stella Maynard, fixed all of Stephen's favorite foods, including her famous cherry delight cake. Each family member let Stephen know how proud they were of